// IFF718 — Programme design, metrics, and institutional integrity
$CATEGORY: VERITAS/IFF718

::IFF718-Q1::A predictive risk-scoring model trained on historically biased case-selection data will typically\: {
    ~Automatically correct the historical bias#Incorrect. Models inherit biases present in their training data; mathematical form does not confer neutrality.
    =Reproduce and potentially amplify the historical bias, dressed in statistical objectivity#Models inherit biases present in their training data; mathematical form does not confer neutrality.
    ~Have no relationship to prior case selection#Incorrect. Models inherit biases present in their training data; mathematical form does not confer neutrality.
    ~Only affect cases involving crypto-assets#Incorrect. Models inherit biases present in their training data; mathematical form does not confer neutrality.
}

::IFF718-Q2::'Scoring without capacity' describes a failure mode in which\: {
    ~A model produces no flagged cases at all#Incorrect. A backlog of correctly flagged but unactioned cases creates a discoverable record that the institution knew of the risk and failed to act.
    =An institution generates more correctly flagged high-risk cases than it can investigate, creating a documented accountability exposure#A backlog of correctly flagged but unactioned cases creates a discoverable record that the institution knew of the risk and failed to act.
    ~Data quality is too poor to run any model#Incorrect. A backlog of correctly flagged but unactioned cases creates a discoverable record that the institution knew of the risk and failed to act.
    ~A model is retired before deployment#Incorrect. A backlog of correctly flagged but unactioned cases creates a discoverable record that the institution knew of the risk and failed to act.
}

::IFF718-Q3::The CJEU's ruling in C-37/20 & C-601/20 (22 November 2022) held that\: {
    ~Beneficial-ownership registers must be entirely private#Incorrect. The Court found unrestricted public access disproportionate under Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter, prompting a legitimate-interest-based access model in the later AML Package.
    =Unrestricted public access to BO registers was a disproportionate interference with EU Charter rights to private life and data protection#The Court found unrestricted public access disproportionate under Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter, prompting a legitimate-interest-based access model in the later AML Package.
    ~FATF Recommendation 24 is invalid#Incorrect. The Court found unrestricted public access disproportionate under Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter, prompting a legitimate-interest-based access model in the later AML Package.
    ~CRS reporting violates EU law#Incorrect. The Court found unrestricted public access disproportionate under Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter, prompting a legitimate-interest-based access model in the later AML Package.
}

::IFF718-Q4::FATF's Immediate Outcomes (IOs) are rated on which scale? {
    ~Compliant / Largely Compliant / Partially Compliant / Non-Compliant#Incorrect. Effectiveness under the IOs is rated High, Substantial, Moderate or Low, distinct from the Technical Compliance four-point scale.
    =High / Substantial / Moderate / Low#Effectiveness under the IOs is rated High, Substantial, Moderate or Low, distinct from the Technical Compliance four-point scale.
    ~Pass / Fail#Incorrect. Effectiveness under the IOs is rated High, Substantial, Moderate or Low, distinct from the Technical Compliance four-point scale.
    ~Green / Amber / Red#Incorrect. Effectiveness under the IOs is rated High, Substantial, Moderate or Low, distinct from the Technical Compliance four-point scale.
}

::IFF718-Q5::South Africa was placed on the FATF grey list in\: {
    ~February 2021#Incorrect. South Africa was added to the FATF increased-monitoring list in February 2023, and removed in October 2025.
    =February 2023#South Africa was added to the FATF increased-monitoring list in February 2023, and removed in October 2025.
    ~October 2025#Incorrect. South Africa was added to the FATF increased-monitoring list in February 2023, and removed in October 2025.
    ~February 2024#Incorrect. South Africa was added to the FATF increased-monitoring list in February 2023, and removed in October 2025.
}

::IFF718-Q6::Kenya's FATF grey-listing occurred in\: {
    ~February 2023#Incorrect. Kenya was placed on the FATF grey list in February 2024.
    =February 2024#Kenya was placed on the FATF grey list in February 2024.
    ~October 2025#Incorrect. Kenya was placed on the FATF grey list in February 2024.
    ~February 2022#Incorrect. Kenya was placed on the FATF grey list in February 2024.
}

::IFF718-Q7::Capture of the enforcement function is described in this module as particularly harmful because\: {
    ~It has no effect on FATF ratings#Incorrect. A captured enforcement function retains the appearance of legitimacy while providing cover for continued abuse, making it worse than having no system at all.
    =It provides a legitimating appearance of a functioning system while actively shielding the conduct the system purports to prevent#A captured enforcement function retains the appearance of legitimacy while providing cover for continued abuse, making it worse than having no system at all.
    ~It only affects private-sector compliance officers#Incorrect. A captured enforcement function retains the appearance of legitimacy while providing cover for continued abuse, making it worse than having no system at all.
    ~It is limited to customs administrations#Incorrect. A captured enforcement function retains the appearance of legitimacy while providing cover for continued abuse, making it worse than having no system at all.
}

::IFF718-Q8::An effective whistleblower-protection framework, per this lesson, must address\: {
    ~Retaliation protection only#Incorrect. The lesson identifies four distinct risks — retaliatory action, physical threat, reporting-channel independence, and career marginalisation, that must all be addressed.
    =Retaliation, physical safety, independent reporting channels, and career-marginalisation risk together#The lesson identifies four distinct risks — retaliatory action, physical threat, reporting-channel independence, and career marginalisation, that must all be addressed.
    ~Only anonymous online reporting portals#Incorrect. The lesson identifies four distinct risks — retaliatory action, physical threat, reporting-channel independence, and career marginalisation, that must all be addressed.
    ~Compensation for lost bonuses only#Incorrect. The lesson identifies four distinct risks — retaliatory action, physical threat, reporting-channel independence, and career marginalisation, that must all be addressed.
}